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Abstract 
 
China’s Hukou system poses severe restrictions on labor mobility. This paper assesses the 
consequences of relaxing these restrictions for China’s internal economic geography. We base 
our analysis on a new economic geography model. First, we obtain estimates of the important 
model parameters on the basis of information on 264 of China’s prefecture cities over the 
period 1999-2005. Second, and by using our estimation results as input, we simulate various 
long-run scenarios of China’s internal economic geography that differ in their degree of 
interregional labor mobility. We find that increased labor mobility will lead to more 
pronounced core-periphery outcomes. Interestingly, these agglomerations are not necessarily 
along the coastal regions. Given the increased importance of China’s internal market, firms 
agglomerate in the populous heartland of China. China’s internal demand will be the most 
important determinant of its future economic geography. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the World Development Report 2009, economic development is to a large extent 
driven by economic geography (World Bank, 2008). Economic geography refers not only to 
physical characteristics of the landscape, but also – and most importantly – to man-made 
economic geography in the sense of a region’s access to upstream and downstream markets or 
the degree of urbanization. The analytical underpinnings for this (re)discovery of the 
relevance of economic geography come in no small part from the new economic geography 
literature initiated by Krugman (1991) in which the balance between agglomerating and 
spreading forces determines the location of economic activity. The relevance of this approach 
has been shown for the cases of the US, and Europe, and only recently attention has shifted 
towards developing countries like China.  
China is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Also, it is home to a huge 
(potential) internal market and a large number of very large and fast-growing cities. Arguably, 
China is a textbook case to analyze how agglomerating and spreading forces can shape the 
economic landscape. To cite Krugman (2010, p.14): “Chinese economic geography is highly 
reminiscent of the economic geography of the advanced nations circa 1900 and it fits 
gratifyingly well into the new economic geography framework.” 
  The recent phenomenal growth record of China has been accompanied by increased 
migration from the western and central provinces to China’s eastern (coastal) provinces 
(World Bank, 2008). Recent studies like Au and Henderson (2006a,b), however, argue that 
Chinese cities are undersized due to severe restrictions on labor mobility that are still imposed 
through the so called Hukou system (see also Chan, 2008 and 2009). As a result, China is 
thought not to reap the full benefits of agglomeration. A simple illustration of this fact is that 
the Gini-coefficient for the Chinese city size distribution was 0.43 in 2000.  Compared to a 
world-average Gini-coefficient of 0.564, this indicates a more evenly sized city size 
distribution in China (Fujita et al, 2004, p. 2955).             
In this paper, we consider the impact of the Hukou system on the spatial distribution of 
economic activity in China. In particular, we use a new economic geography (NEG) model 
(Puga, 1999) to analyse the agglomeration-labor mobility nexus for China. We argue that 
NEG models are particularly suited to analyse the case of rapidly industrializing economies 
like China. NEG models analyze agglomeration in terms of (changes) in the balance between 
spreading and agglomeration forces.
2  A feature of the NEG model in Puga (1999) that makes 
                                                 
2 See also Krugman (2010, p.15):” …to return briefly to the issue of general, abstract models versus historical 
specificity: surely the strong resemblance between China’s industrial clusters today and the industrial clusters of   2
it particularly well-suited for our case is that in his model, the balance between these forces 
and hence the equilibrium spatial distribution of economic activity depends explicitly on the 
degree of interregional labor mobility. This makes this model a natural starting point to assess 
the relaxation of the Hukou restrictions on China’s internal economic geography.  
Based on a sample of 264 Chinese Prefecture cities, we first estimate the equilibrium 
wage equation that is central in NEG models. The estimated wage equation not only 
empirically establishes the link between a city’s wages and its market access (see also Hering 
and Poncet, 2010); it also provides two key model parameters that are central in our 
subsequent simulation analysis of the relationship between agglomeration and labor mobility.  
Our paper crucially differs from related recent NEG studies for China (e.g. Ma, 2006, 
Lin, 2003, Hering and Poncet, 2007, 2010, De Sousa and Poncet, 2007, or Amiti and 
Javorcik, 2008).
3 First, we do not take the spatial allocation of labor (and firms) as given. 
Instead, we make use of the complete NEG model and not just the equilibrium (nominal) 
wage equation. This enables us to analyse the possible effects of relaxing China’s Hukou 
system on its internal economic geography. Second, in doing this we go beyond the simple 
migration dynamics that underlie most theoretical NEG models and consider more intricate 
and realistic migration dynamics.  
Our main findings show that a relaxation of the restrictions on labor mobility posed by 
the Hukou system will lead to more pronounced core-periphery outcomes. Interestingly, the 
economic geography of China that would result from such increased labor mobility is first and 
foremost determined by within China differences in market access, population and (arable) 
land. The geography of China’s own internal demand is the most important determinant of its 
future economic geography. Given the increasing importance of China’s own huge domestic 
market, international market access is of less significance in determining the spatial 
distribution of economic activity. Our simulations show that increased labor mobility   
primarily benefits non-coastal Prefecture cities like Zhoukou or Liuan in the large and 
populous Honan and Anhwei provinces. Prefecture cities like Shanghai or Guangzhou that 
have currently a very high market access do not necessarily end up being the main centers of 
economic activity once inter-city firm and labor mobility are taken into account.  
                                                                                                                                                          
the 19th-century – especially the export-oriented clusters of late-Victorian Britain – strikes a blow in favor of the 
argument for simple, common principles.”  In particular the focus in most NEG models on the agricultural and 
manufacturing sector as the 2 relevant sectors may seem outdated for western countries but it is (still) relevant 
for a country like China.   
3 Roberts et al. (2010) also use the full NEG model in their analyis of Chinese economic geogaphy but their 
focus is not on labor mobility but on the impact of changes in the Chinese infrastructure on the spatial 
distribution of economic activity.         3
 
2.  Labor mobility in China and the implications from a NEG perspective 
Since the 1950s the Chinese authorities have been much concerned with internal labor 
migration flows and rural-urban labor migration in particular. The Chinese government 
alternated between periods of more and less restrictive migration policies (Zhao, 2004, Fujita 
et al, 2004, Chan and Buckingham, 2008; World Bank, 2008, ch 5, and Chan, 2009) but ever 
since the 1950s the so called Hukou system has been a main feature of its internal migration 
policies. Although the system might have become somewhat less restrictive over time it is 
still very much a prominent characteristic of the Chinese labor market (see f.i. the detailed 
description of the Hukou system in The Economis of May 6
th, 2010). The Hukou system is 
equivalent to an internal visa arrangement that is meant to regulate migration. In recent 
decades the system has been quite restrictive, not only by limiting (official) migration flows 
from rural to urban areas, but also by putting a brake on inter-urban migration flows (Chan 
and Buckinham, 2008, Au and Henderson, 2006a,b; Poncet, 2006, Henderson, 2009). Without 
a visa for a particular location, a Chinese citizen has no or only limited rights to housing, sell 
property, education, food or social security in that location. Those rights are tied to one’s 
official place of residence and a change in residency (if a citizen for instance would try to 
move from a rural area to a city) will only be matched with a transfer of these rights if the 
(local) authorities hand out a visa or permit for the new place of  residence.  
Until recently (see in particular Chan, 2009 or Chan and Buckingham, 2008, pp. 13-
14), migration under the Hukou  system had two equally important dimensions. The first 
concerns the restrictions regarding preferred locations alluded to above. To be granted 
permission to live and work in a city or any other location, and to be entitled with the 
aforementioned rights to public provisions, households need a local Hukou.  The second 
dimension is functional and refers to the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural 
workers. Within each location, a further distinction is made between agricultural and non-
agricultural workers. Non-agricultural workers with a local Hukou are traditionally entitled to 
more rights than agricultural workers. The local and functional classification combined thus 
define four possible categories of residents (Chan, 2009, p.202).  
In recent years,  the  Hukou  system has become less of a constraint (Chan and 
Buckingham, 2008). With urban wages outstripping rural wages, the result has been an 
increase in official as well as illegal (temporary) migration into the booming cities. One 
important change is that currently, in many cases, the local instead of the central government 
decides upon the permits. This gives local governments some degree of freedom with respect   4
to the leniency of granting these permits. A second change is that the distinction between a 
non-agricultural and an agricultural Hukou has become relatively less important (Chan, 2009).  
The key issue for a migrant is now foremost whether he or she has a local Hukou, which is 
primarily concerned with the location of a worker.  
Although the system has become less stringent and more differentiated, the fact that 
temporary and illegal migration flows to the main cities have been surging shows that the 
Hukou system is still very restrictive. “all these restrictions sharply reduce the benefits and 
raise the costs of migration, particularly into large cities. Migration is limited and most 
migration is short-term, or “return” migration. (…). Overall the hukou system holds 
hundreds of millions of people in locations where they are not exploiting their earnings 
potential.” (Fujita et al., 2004, p. 2957).  Chan (2008) estimates that between 1982 and 2006, 
the annual volume of Hukou migrants amounted to 17- 20 million people. The impact of the 
labor mobility restrictions is clear from the stability of this annual official migration flows 
(Fujita et al, 2004, p. 2957). This stability also suggests that neither the scrapping of the 
functional Hukou nor the decentralization of the migration policy has had a substantial impact 
on the flow of permanent (official) migrants to the cities.
4   
 
Figure 1. Urbanization and gross national income (GNI) per capita for countries 
 
Source: Henderson (2009) based on World Bank Development indicators, 2006; urbanized = degree of 
urbanization; lngni = PPP corrected GNI per capita (in logs) 
  
                                                 
4 We do not have information on illegal migration/workers. In China there are very substantial temporary 
migration flows to cities, part of which is illegal. As a consequence, many workers do not have a local Hukou of 
that city. In our data set, we can only deal with official (legal) city population data. For an instructive lucid 
summary of the current Hukou system see http://chunzhu.wordpress.com/2008/04/22/understanding-the-hukou-
system/. See also Chan (2009) for a very good introduction to and assessment of the Hukou system.        
CHN   5
What are the consequences of the Hukou system for China? Au and Henderson (2006a,b) 
forcefully argue that Chinese cities are too small as a consequence of the migration 
restrictions and that the agglomeration rents associated with urbanization are therefore 
underutilized (see also Fujita et al, 2004).
5 The associated welfare losses of the lack of labor 
mobility are considerable (Whalley and Zhang, 2007). Figure 1 illustrates this line of 
argument in a stylized way (Henderson, 2009): China’s income per capita is associated with a 
below average degree of urbanisation.  
However, apart from the general prediction that relaxing Hukou’s migration 
restrictions will most likely result in higher urbanization rates and larger and/or more uneven-
sized Chinese cities (Au and Henderson, 2006a), little work has been done on assessing the 
impact of increased labor mobility on the internal economic geography of China. Will it result 
in very strong core-periphery patterns, with most economic activity concentrated in a few 
very large cities? And if so, which cities or regions will be able to attract economic activity 
and which cities will thereby become more peripheral? Or will core periphery patterns 
become less pronounced? From an economic development perspective this is important given 
the well established positive relationship between agglomeration (urbanization) and economic 
development (see World Bank (2008) and Figure 1 above).  
The main aim of this paper is to shed light on this subject by investigating the 
implications of different labor mobility regimes for the spatial distribution of people and 
economic activity across Chinese cities. Based on a general NEG model, we analyze theory-
based predictions regarding the effect of changes in interregional labor mobility for China’s 
internal economic geography. We argue that the NEG approach is useful because labor 
mobility plays a key role in NEG models.  
In NEG models a less than perfect interregional labor mobility results in wage 
differences between regions: large agglomerations have higher wages than more peripheral 
areas. Economic centers offer firms (and workers) better access to upstream and downstream 
markets. With perfect labor mobility instead, i.e. perfectly elastic interregional labor supply, 
economic centers will simply attract more workers (and firms) until (real) wages are equalized 
across locations (or all footloose workers have migrated to the centre before complete real 
wage equality is reached).
6 The Chinese Hukou system poses considerable restrictions on the 
degree of interregional labor immobility. According to NEG theory this has the effect that 
                                                 
5 Or as The Economist
 of September 18th 2010 states: “China’s small cties exploded in number. But its biggest 
metropolises conspiciously failed to explode in size (…). This partly reflects a conscicious policy. Although 
China’s rulers have embraced urbamisation, theyare  still wary of mega-cities” (p. 84). 
6 See also our discussion of the NEG model in section 3 and in particular of the wage equation (2).    6
Chinese cities with a high market access are expected to have higher wages than cities with a 
low market access.
7   
In our empirical sections we will confirm this wages-market access hypothesis using 
information on a sample of 264 Chinese prefecture cities. Subsequently, and based on this 
result, we adopt a simulation strategy to reveal the possible consequences of relaxing the 
Hukou restrictions for China’s economic geography.  
.             
3.  The NEG model    
We start by briefly introducing the NEG model that we use as the basis of our empirical 
investigation. We adopt the NEG model by Puga (1999) as our benchmark model. This model 
encompasses a variety of NEG models as special cases, notably the core models by Krugman 
(1991), Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996). More importantly for our 
purposes (see also the discussion in Hu, 2002), it explicitly distinguishes between different 
labor mobility regimes. It easily facilitates comparing the consequences of different degrees 
of labor mobility on the resulting spatial distribution of economic activity.  
The  R (i=1,…,R) region version of the model can be understood as follows (see 
Appendix A1 for a more detailed exposition of the model). Each of the R regions is populated 
by Li workers and endowed with Ki units of arable land. Each region’s economy consists if 
two sectors: agriculture and industry. Labor is used by both sectors and is mobile between 
sectors within a region and it is either mobile or immobile between regions. Land on the other 
hand is used only by the agricultural sector and is immobile between regions.  
This stylized depiction of a region’s economy resembles the definition of a Chinese 
Prefecture city with its non-urban part (producing agricultural goods) and urban part 
(producing manufacturing goods) quite well. In addition, see Chan and Buckingham (2008) 
and our discussion in section 2, the current Hukou system allows for intra-Prefecture city 
labor mobility between the urban and non-urban part of a Prefecture city. In particular, the 
declined importance of the distinction between the agricultural and the non-agricultural 
Hukou within each Prefecture implies that, in terms of the model, labor can move relatively 
easy between the two sectors. Empirical evidence also backs up this idea that inter-sector 
                                                 
7 Indeed, the link between imperfect labor mobility and the wages-market access relationship is the starting point 
for the recent NEG empirical studies that try to establish if Chinese wages do depend positively on market 
access, see Hering and Poncet (2006, 2007), Au and Henderson (2006a), De Sousa and Poncet (2007), Moreno 
Monroy (2010), Lin (2003) and our own estimations in section 4. Market access is also a determinant of the 
location decisions of firms. Building on Head and Mayer (2004) and also invoking imperfect labor mobility, 
Amiti and Javorcik (2008) show for instance that FDI flows to Chinese regions depends positively on the market 
access of those regions, for a similar result using an NEG model see Ma (2006).      7
labor mobility within Chinese Prefecture cities is important. Fujita et al (2004, p. 2958, Table 
2) e.g. document for instance that in the 1990s the non-agricultural employment growth 
clearly outstripped population growth which can be interpreted as a sign of inter-sector labor 
mobility.  
The agricultural good is produced using land and labor (combined in a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, with 0 < θ < 1 denoting labor’s share in agricultural production)
8. Its 
market is assumed to be perfectly competitive with free entry and exit. Moreover it is freely 
tradable between regions. The assumed production structure in agriculture implies 
diminishing returns in this sector, so that any attempt of manufacturing firms to lure workers 
away from the agricultural sector implies wage increases (see Chan, 2009, p. 208 on the wage 
elasticity of intra-regional manufacturing labor supply). In this sense Ki acts as a spreading 
force in the model with similar consequences as the housing sector in Helpman (1998). It 
captures in a stylized way the costs of congestion associated with larger agglomerations. This 
presence of this additional congestion force sets Puga (1999) apart from earlier contributions 
by Krugman (1991) or Venables (1996). 
The industrial sector produces heterogeneous varieties of a single good under 
monopolistic competition and free entry and exit, incurring so-called ‘iceberg’ trade costs 
when shipped between regions (τij ≥ 1 goods have to be shipped from region i to let one good 
arrive in region j). Industrial production technology is characterized by increasing returns to 
scale. The production input is a Cobb-Douglas composite of labor and intermediates, with 0 ≤ 
μ ≤ 1 the Cobb-Douglas share of intermediates. Intermediates enter the production function as 
a composite manufacturing good that is specified as a CES-aggregate (with σ > 1 the 
elasticity of substitution across varieties) of all manufacturing varieties produced. Finally, 
regions are allowed to differ in their production efficiency, yet firms within the same region 
are assumed to be similar in this
9. 
Consumers in turn have Cobb-Douglas preferences over the agricultural good and a 
CES-composite (also with σ > 1 the elasticity of substitution across varieties) of 
manufacturing varieties, with 0  ≤  γ  ≤ 1  the Cobb-Douglas share of the composite 
manufacturing good. Specifying the composite manufacturing good in this way ensures 
                                                 
8 Puga (1999) defines the agricultural sector somewhat more general. However, when deriving analytical results, 
a Cobb-Douglas production function in agriculture is used, see Puga (1999, p. 318). 
9 This is our only deviation from the standard Puga (1999) model. It is introduced to be able to take account of 
other reasons (human capital, sectoral structure, comparative advantage) why some regions may be able to offer 
higher wages than interregional differences in market access (see our discussion of equation (5) in section 5.1).   8
demand for each manufacturing variety from each region, implying that trade takes place 
between Chinese Prefectures. 
Next, equilibrium (factor) prices and demand follow from profit and utility 
maximization on behalf of firms and consumers respectively (again see Appendix A1 for the 
details). These in turn determine the spatial distribution of economic activity. Puga (1999) 
shows that this distribution depends critically on the assumptions made regarding 
interregional labor mobility. 
In case there is no labor mobility between regions, the model reduces to the following 
three equilibrium conditions for each region i (for the (manufacturing) price index qi, the 
(manufacturing) wage wi, and total expenditures on manufactures ei respectively):  
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where (in addition to the variables and parameters already introduced) ςi denotes the share of 
region  i’s labor force in manufacturing, ci is a region specific indicator of production 
efficiency, and  r(wi) the rent earned per unit of land in region i. These conditions (partly) 
follow from the requirement that in equilibrium no worker has to have an incentive to move 
from the agricultural to the manufacturing sector or vice versa. That is, equilibrium is 
characterized by nominal wage equality between sectors within each region. 
When labor is instead allowed to move between regions, nominal wage equality 
between sectors within each region is no longer enough to ensure equilibrium. Workers now 
also move in response to real wage differences  between regions. As a result, with 
interregional labor mobility, equilibrium is characterized not only by (1) – (3) but also by 
interregional real wage equality (i.e. labor moves until real wages ωi are equalized across all 
regions):      
ii i qw i
γ ωω
− ==∀         ( 4 )  
From a model perspective, the absence or presence of (some degree of) interregional labor 
mobility is important because it changes the mix of agglomeration and spreading forces. 
Hereby the two different scenarios can result in radically different long run spatial equilibria. 
Without any interregional labor mobility, and given the (crucial) assumption that agricultural 
production takes place under decreasing returns to labour, the agglomeration of   9
manufacturing firms to particular core regions has a price tag in the form of higher wages.  
The additional workers needed in the manufacturing sector can only come from the local 
agricultural sector. The excess labor demand from the manufacturing sector drives up wages 
in this region, creating interregional wage differences between core and peripheral regions, 
that persist in equilibrium. The rising wages also create, ceteris paribus, a spreading force that 
makes manufacturing firms return to regions with lower wages. With perfect interregional 
labor mobility, this upward pressure on wages is instead countered by the additional supply of 
labor that moves from peripheral to core regions in response to the higher wages offered in 
the core regions. As such, a higher degree of labor mobility typically results in an economic 
geography characterized by stronger core-periphery patterns than in case of imperfect labor 
mobility
10. 
The empirical sections in this paper are closely related to the NEG model set out 
above. In section 5, we estimate the equilibrium wage equation (2) in order to obtain 
estimates of some of the important model parameters. In section 6 we go one step further than 
earlier empirical NEG studies on China (or in fact most empirical NEG studies in general
11), 
and simulate the full NEG model to assess what the long run spatial distribution of economic 
in China would look like under different assumptions regarding the degree of interreginal 
labor mobility.  
 
4.  Data set and a first look at China’s economic geography 
At the highest level of aggregation, China is composed of 33 administrative units (22 
provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 large municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and 
Chongqing) and 2 special regions (Hong Kong and Macau). The 2
nd tier of regional division, 
the so called Prefecture level, in China consists of 333 regions. Of these 333 regions at the 
Prefecture level, 283 regions are Prefecture-cities
12. Our data set consists of data for a large 
subset of these Prefecture cities for the period 1995-2002: 264 of the 283 cities are included. 
Even though the data do not cover the whole of China, most of its population and economic 
activity is included. Our 264 prefecture cities cover 86% of total population in China and 96% 
                                                 
10 Although this need not necessarily be the case. 
11 Virtually all empirical contributions in the NEG literature are based on the wage equation. See e.g. Redding 
and Venables (2004), Hanson (2005), Knaap (2006) or Hering and Poncet (2010). 
12 Note that the prefectures not only include the urban population of a city, but also the rural area surrounding a 
particular city, in many Prefecture cities in our data set the majority of the population as well as the bulk of the 
land area is classified as non-urban. Apart from the 283 Prefecture cities the 2
nd tier of regional administration 
also consists of 17 Prefectures (mainly in Xinjiang and Tibet), 30 Autonomous Prefectures (in western China, 
regions with a large share of ethnic minorities) and 3 Leagues (regions in Inner Mongolia), see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_divisions_of_China#Prefecture_level_subdivisions.     10
of total GDP.  In Appendix A2 we list for every regional unit at the highest level of 
administration (we have data on 30 of the total of 33 regions)
13 the corresponding Prefecture 
cities that are in our data set.  
Our data on these 264 Chinese prefecture cities come from the Chinese Data Center at 
the University of Michigan (see http://chinadatacenter.org/newcdc/). The original data source 
is the National Bureau of Statistics of China. From this database we collect data on each 
prefecture city’s expenditures (income), total population, employment, its available arable 
land (in km
2), as well as distance to the nearest major ports, secondary education enrolment, 
the share of employment in banking and finance, and its total area. Moreover we obtained the 
(great-circle) distances between each prefecture city-pair. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of people and industry employment across Prefecture cities 
 
a. Distribution of population      b. Distribution of sec. industry employment 
Source: our data set; N/A = not available and/or not a prefecture city; data shown are for 2002.  
 
To give an idea of China’s current economic geography, Figure 2a and 2b show the (2002) 
distribution of population, and secondary industry employment (a proxy for the distribution of 
manufacturing activity) respectively across our sample of 264 Prefecture cities.  
Figure 2a shows that the largest concentration of population is found in an area that 
can be loosely defined as the part of China that lies within the Shanghai-Chongqing-Beijing 
                                                 
13 We have no data on the following 3 regions out of the group of 33 regions: Hong Kong, Macau,  and Tibet.  
The same underlying data set is also used by for instance Au and Henderson (2006a) or Moreno Monroy (2010).   11
triangle. This triangle mainly encompasses the provinces of Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Kiangsu 
and Sjantung (it also covers the populous part of Hebei province). Taken together these 5 
provinces alone are home to 34% of the Chinese population and to almost 28% of our 264 
Prefecture cities (these numbers are 40% and 32% resp. if Hebei province would be included). 
The presence of these many, relatively populous, Prefecture cities in China’s heartland will 
turn out to be very important in the long-run equilibrium analysis of our NEG model in 
section 5. 
Figure 2b furthermore shows that the distribution of manufacturing activity does not 
correspond one-to-one with the distribution of people. Industry employment (panel b) is more 
spatially concentrated (Herfindahl index (HI) = 0.01) than population (HI=0.006), with a few 
notable Prefecture cities like Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing (the large black area 
in panel b) each home to 3-5% of total Chinese industry employment.
14 By contrast, the 
population share of either of these four cities amounts to no more than 1%. The five earlier 
mentioned provinces in China’s populous heartland together contain about 30% of total 
industry employment. 
To assess how China’s internal economic geography, depicted by Figure 2, might 
change due to a loosening of the Hukou restrictions, we now turn to our empirical strategy. 
We start by estimating NEG’s wage equation in order to obtain empirically grounded 
estimates of important model parameters. We then subsequently use these estimates, and 
simulate the full NEG model under various different labor mobility scenarios. 
 
5  Estimating the wage equation for Chinese cities  
In order to be able to provide theory-based predictions of the effects of different labor 
mobility regimes for China’s internal economic geography, we need estimates of all the 
important model parameters of our NEG model. Estimates of the share of intermediate inputs 
(μ) in manufacturing production, the share of income spent on manufactures (γ) and the Cobb-
Douglas share of labor in agriculture (θ) are relatively easy to obtain. Based on a regional 
input-output table for China for 2000 we can infer μ and γ for China as a whole. To be 
specific, we take μ = 0.51 (I-O table: Chinese intermediate demand for Chinese 
manufacturing by Chinese manufacturing firms) and γ = 0.34 (I-O table: Chinese final 
                                                 
14 A perfectly even spread of population or secondary employment would give a HI of 0.0038. As we will 
explain in section 5 the Prefecture “city” of Chongqing  is a rather special case.    12
demand for Chinese manufacturing as share of total final demand for Chinese output).
15 
Moreover, we obtain θ = 0.87 from the Statistical Yearbook of the Chinese Bureau of 
Statistics as the share of wages in total agricultural value added (indicating that agricultural 
production is (still) relatively labor intensive in China). 
  However, besides these three important parameters, we also need an estimate of σ, the 
elasticity of substitution between manufacturing varieties. To get at this, we estimate the 
following log-linearized version of the equilibrium wage equation (2): 
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where the productivity differences between regions, ci in (2), are captured by several observed 
control variables (Xit) on the one hand (see below for more on our specific choice of controls) 
and a random error term εit that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the included regressors on 
the other hand. In addition, we allow ci to differ between cities for unobserved reasons by 
including prefecture city dummies (captured by the αi’s in (5)), and we include year dummies 
to control for general improvements in production efficiency equally affecting all cities in the 
sample (captured by the αt’s in (5)). 
Estimating the NEG wage equation lies at the heart of most earlier empirical NEG 
studies. It has been used to verify whether market access (the term between brackets) plays an 
important role in explaining interregional wage differences. In case of China, Hering and 
Poncet (2010) for example estimate a similar wage equation as (5). They provide strong 
evidence in support of NEG’s prediction that workers living in regions with better market 
access than others c.p. earn higher wages.  
Note that (5) is actually a simplified version of (2). Besides the market access term,   
(5) should in effect also contain an additional term involving qi. This other term is frequently 
referred to as a region’s supplier access. We exclude this term from (5), effectively assuming 
that μ = 0 (see also Hering and Poncet, 2010). As shown and emphasized by Redding and 
Venables, 2004), including both supplier and market access in the wage equation leads to 
multi-collinearity problems.  
Besides this issue of multicollinearity, a few other estimation issues remain when 
estimating (5). First, in order to arguably limit problems with reverse causality (see Hanson, 
2005), we include a market access measure in (5) that is based on data at one level of 
                                                 
15 Source: regional I/O table from Institute of Developing Economies (2003), “Multi-Regional Input-Output 
Table for China 2000”.    13
aggregation higher than our prefecture data. These province variables (j=1, …30) are 
constructed by aggregating the corresponding prefecture variables in the sample to the 
province level (Hanson (2005) uses a similar aggregation for his sample of US counties).  
Second, in the absence of actual trade costs data, we, as all other existing empirical 
NEG studies, proxy these trade costs by specifying a trade cost function (see Bosker and 
Garretsen, 2010 for a recent discussion on the use of a trade cost function in empirical NEG). 
In particular, we proxy trade costs by a simple power distance function: τij=(Dij)
δ
,  Dij is 
defined as the distance between city i and the capital of province j. Trade costs within one’s 
own province (τii) are proxied similarly using a, by now standard, measure of internal 
distance:  2
3
j area
ii D π = . The use of such a distance function introduces the distance decay 
parameter δ as an additional important model parameter. 
Thirdly, we do not directly observe the manufacturing price index, qi, that is present in 
the market access term. To overcome this problem we follow Brakman, Garretsen and 
Schramm (2004) and approximate qj as follows
16. Under the earlier assumption of μ = 0, 
wages are the most important determinant of prices. As such, we proxy a province’s 
manufacturing price index by a weighted combination of information on a province’s own 
wage level with the average wage outside that province (weighted by distance to correct for 
the transport costs involved in importing goods from other provinces):  
() () {}
1
1 1 1
, 1 j j j j j centre qW w D
σ σ σδ λλ
− − − =+ −                  (6) 
where  w  is the average wage of all other provinces in the sample, and Dj,centre the distance 
between the capital of province j and the nearest economic centre; Beijing, Shanghai or 
Quandung. λj is the share of employees of province j. When estimating (5) we substitute (6) 
for qj in equation (5).  
Two basic empirical strategies have been used to estimate (5). The first, introduced by 
Redding and Venables (2004), is to use the information contained in bilateral trade data to 
construct a theory-based measure of each region’s market access. Subsequently this   
constructed measure of market access is included in the estimation of the wage equation. In 
case of China, Hering and Poncet (2006, 2007), Lin (2003) and Ma (2006) have for example 
followed this strategy using  data on inter-provincial trade. The second strategy, following 
                                                 
16 Two other options to deal with unavailability of data on city priced indices are; to go for nominal instead of 
real market access (see Au and Henderson 2006a) which takes us out of the world of NEG, or to opt for a 
solution whereby other equilibrium conditions of the underlying NEG model can be used (Hanson, 2005). The 
2
nd route followed by Hanson (2005) has the drawback that real wage equalization must be assumed, which is 
unrealistic for China.   14
Hanson (2005), is to estimate (5) directly using nonlinear estimation techniques. We opt for 
this second strategy here because there is, to our knowledge, no bilateral trade data available 
at the Prefecture-city level that (sufficiently) cover our sample. Other related market access 
studies for China, adopting such a more direct approach are e.g. Amiti and Javorcik (2008) or 
Au and Henderson (2006a).  
  Table 1 shows the results of estimating (5). In all our regressions, we use prefecture 
city specific gdp per capita as our measure of wages wi. Data on the average wage of workers 
in the urban part of each prefecture city, and data on the total wage of employees are   
available but following Hering and Poncet (2007, p. 13) who argue that the available 
prefectural city wage data do not sufficiently reflect wages in the private sector, we did not 
use either of these two wage measures as our main dependent variable, opting for gdp per 
capita instead. Expenditures ej are proxied by a prefecture city’s income. 
Finally, to capture possible productivity difference between prefecture cities (ci in (2)) 
we include the following control variables (Xit) in (5). In urban economics a city’s density 
itself is typically related to higher productivity levels because of increasing returns associated 
with the well-known Marshallian externalities of e.g. labor market pooling and knowledge or 
input sharing. To control for this, and in line with for instance Hering and Poncet (2010), 
Breinlich (2006) and Bosker and Garretsen (2008), we include population density to (5). 
Second, we also follow these authors and include a proxy for human capital as a higher 
educated workforce is likely to be more productive
17. To control for the possible relevance of 
the economic structure of a city, we add the share of banking and finance in total Prefecture-
city employment to our regression.  
Finally, we allow for unobserved (time-invariant) differences in productivity between 
cities by including a full set of prefecture city dummies, at the same time also controlling for 
possible common shocks to overall Chinese productivity by including a full set of year 
dummies as well. Including prefecture fixed effects allows some cities to have a comparative 
advantage in attracting workers and/or industry. In particular it helps to control for the cities 
in our sample that are located along China’s coast and that are often specialized in exporting 
to world markets (Hu, 2002, Au and Henderson, 2006a) and able to pay higher wages. As 
Krugman (2009, 2010) points out China’s overall comparative advantage in the international 
economy (e.g in low cost manufacturing goods) goes along with a strong and very uneven 
                                                 
17 For their sample of 51 Chinese cities, Hering and Poncet (2010) use micro data which allows for a much better 
control of various wage determinants besides market access.      15
spatial concentration of economic activity in China itself.
18 We try to control for this supply 
driven part of China’s economic geography in our estimations by including city fixed effects. 
The fixed effects may also to some extent capture the effect(s) of Chinese industrial policy 
where specific regions or cities are favored over others. Recall that the basic term in the wage 
equation that we are interested in, the market acces term,  is about the spatial allocation of 
demand for a prefecture city’s manufacured goods. 
 
Table 1.   Results of estimating the NEG wage equation  
Dependent variable: ln(urban gdp per cap.) 
 (a)  (b) 
σ  5.886*** 
(.70) 
5.776*** 
(.70) 
δ .632*** 
(.04) 
.636*** 
(.04) 
secondary education    1.664*** 
(.51) 
1.657*** 
(.51) 
% Banking & finance in total employment  .795* 
(.47) 
.791* 
(.40) 
Ln(Distance to nearest seaport city)  
* ln(distance-weighted foreign GDP)  
--- .0182 
(.03) 
Ln(Population density)  .101*** 
(0.02) 
.101*** 
(.02) 
    
Sample period  1999-2005  1999-2005 
Observations 1779  1779 
Adj. R
2  0.968 0.968 
Foreign GDP included in market access   Yes  No 
Fixed effects?  prefecture & year  prefecture & year 
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors between brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. NLS, estimation. secondary education is the student enrolment in regular 
secondary schools as a fraction of city i’s population. population density is measured as city i’s population (in 
10,000 persons) per km
2. Distance-weighted foreign GDP is defined here as ∑i(Yit/Distancekj), where i is USA, 
Japan or EU 15, k is the major seaport of USA, Japan or EU 15 (Los Angeles, Yokohama and Rotterdam, 
respectively), j is the major seaport in China (Shanghai). Distance is measured as great-circle distance. The 
distance between Shanghai and Rotterdam is calculated as the sum of the distance between Shanghai-Djibouti, 
Djibouti-Suez, Suez-Gibraltar, Gibraltar-Rotterdam.  
 
Table 1 shows our results. Its two columns differ in the way we deal with foreign market 
access. Our market access measure as depicted in (5) only captures access to China’s internal 
market. Yet, in fact China is not a closed economy and market access with respect to the rest 
of the world may also be relevant. It is easy to incorporate this in the market access term (see 
also Hering and Poncet, 2010). We make the basic assumption that China trades with the rest 
of the world mostly by sea and that, for simplicity, the rest of the world consists of the three 
economic blocs: the USA, Japan and the EU. Column (a) and (b) then incorporate this in (5) 
in a different way. In our preferred specification (a), we directly include this in the market 
                                                 
18 This spatial allocation is of course not given once and for all. Recently, there have been reports that production 
is moving away from coastal regions to more westward, non coastal regions (like the province Anhwei) where 
wage costs are lower (see “The Next China”in The Economist of July 31
st 2010, pp. 46-48).   16
access term by adding (before taking logs) the economic mass outside of China (measured as 
the sum of distance-weighted GDP of the USA, Japan and the EU 15) to the market access 
term in (5). In column (b) we instead include the economic “mass” outside of China as a 
separate regressor to (5). To take account of differences between prefecture cities in their ease 
of access to the coast we interact this measure with a city’s distance to the nearest seaport
19.  
  The differences between columns (a) and (b) our however minimal. The reason for this 
appears to be that the variation in foreign market access does not contribute much in 
explaining the difference in gdp per capita between Chinese Prefecture cities (it is 
insignificant in column (b)). This, arguably somewhat surprising, finding can be explained by 
the fact that the variation between cities in their access to China’s internal markets dwarfs that 
in their market access to the rest of the world. It makes it hard to attribute the substantial 
variation in gdp per capita between prefecture cities to their foreign market access. This is not 
to deny that coastal cities like Shanghai are not special, but this is already to a large extent 
picked up by our set of Prefecture dummies
20.  
Most importantly, our findings confirm those by earlier studies: we find strong 
evidence that market access plays an important role in explaining the observed wage 
differences between Chinese prefecture cities. The most relevant finding for our purposes is 
however that both the substitution elasticity σ and the transport cost parameter δ  are 
significant. A substitution elasticity of 5.88 is well within the range found in similar NEG 
studies (for e.g. Europe, the US or Sub-Saharan Africa) and it fulfils the theoretical 
requirement that σ > 1. It is also very similar to earlier empirical NEG studies on China. It 
implies a market access (MA) coefficient [1/σ, see (5)] of about 0.17. This is in line with 
Hering and Poncet (2010, MA-coeff. ≈ 0.1), Hering and Poncet (2007, MA-coeff. ≈ 0.07) and 
Moreno Monroy (2010, MA-coeff. ≈ 0.25). This size of the market access coefficient implies 
that a 1% increase in a city’s market access boosts its wages by about 0.17%. Second, our 
estimated distance decay coefficient δ equals 0.63. Again this is very similar to earlier studies. 
Au and Henderson (2006a) e.g., following Poncet (2006), put the distance coefficient at 0.87.  
  The results on our control variables largely confirm earlier findings by e.g. Hering and 
Poncet (2010), Breinlich (2006) or Bosker and Garretsen (2010). Human capital is an 
important determinant of wages. Moreover, population density is also significantly positively 
related to wages, suggesting that the benefits of agglomeration still outweigh any negative 
                                                 
19 Note that distance to the nearest seaport itself is captured by the prefecture fixed effects. Similarly the distance 
weighted sum of foreign GDP is captured by the year fixed effects. 
20 For many coastal cities the fixed effect coefficient is indeed significantly positive (not shown here).   17
congestion effects for the average Chinese city. The share of banking and finance 
employment is not significant at the 5% level.  
As an important robustness check to our findings, we also ran separate cross-section 
estimations of wage equation (5) for 1999 and for 2000 separately. The reason being that it is 
believed that the reliability of the city-population data may be less from 2000 onwards as the 
Chinese authorities allegedly manipulated these data to a much larger extent than before.
21 
Doing this (since we are unable to include prefecture dummies in these cross-section 
regressions, we include province dummies instead), our estimation results for the substitution 
elasticity and the trade cost parameters are very close to the full-sample estimation results 
shown in Table 1. For 1999 we find that these corresponding coefficients are (standard errors 
between brackets, and *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% respectively): 
5.658* (2.95) and 0.478*** (0.013), and for 2000 we find: 5.750** (2.74) and 0.491*** (0.012) 
respectively. Full results are available upon request. 
Contrary to earlier studies that estimated the wage equation for China, here it is only a 
means to an end in our case. Our results in Table 1 confirm the findings in these earlier papers 
that economic geography matters also for the case of China. However, e.g. Hering and Poncet 
(2007, 2010) or Au and Henderson (2006a) stop at this point. As such, they verify whether 
there is evidence for the type of spatial wage pattern suggested by NEG theory given the 
current spatial allocation of workers and firms in China. Our main objective is, however, to 
take the analysis one step further. In the long-run, the location of workers and production is 
not given: market access is endogenous (the hallmark of NEG). In the complete NEG model, 
as discusssed in section 3, workers and firms move in response to the observed differences in 
wages and profits respectively. Although our estimation results in Table 1 confirm the 
existence of the type of spatial wage pattern predicted by NEG theory, it does not give any 
information as to what the future economic geography of China may look like or even 
whether the current economic geogeaphy can be seen as a long-run equilbrium outcome. It is 
not a priori clear why (if at all) an initially large or centrally located (coastal) city, like 
Shanghai, should also be a (even larger) economic centre in the long run equilibrium.  
Here, the full NEG model of section 3 comes into play and not just wage equation (2). 
As such, we view our wage equation estimates as (one of the) inputs to a simulation analysis 
based on the complete NEG model. Doing this allows us to find out what the equilibrium 
                                                 
21 We thank Vernon Henderson for pointing out this problem to us and for the suggestion to use cross-section 
estimations for the initial years of our sample as a robustness check. For the years 1999 and 2000 we only have 
data for 233 of our 264 cities.    18
allocation of economic activity across our sample of Chinese cities would look like under 
various “regimes” of interregional labor mobility. In a stylized way, and within the well-
defined boundaries of our general NEG-model, this gives us predictions on what the impact of 
a loosening of the Hukou restrictions can be on China’s internal economic geography. 
  This is what we turn to in the next section. We will use our estimates in column (a) as 
our benchmark simulation parameters. These estimation results are based on a specification of 
(5) that includes foreign market access in the theoretically most consistent way. We thus set 
the substitution elasticity at 5.88 and the distance parameter at 0.63 in our simulations of the 
full-blown NEG model. 
 
6  Different labor mobility regimes and China’s  internal economic geography . 
We are now in the position to analyse how the long run spatial equilibrium allocation of 
economic activity across Chinese cities may respond to various assumptions with respect to 
interregional labour mobility, i.e. changes in the Hukou regime. As useful analytical solutions 
for the case of R > 2 regions are non-existent in NEG models
22, one has to rely on simulation 
analyses (Behrens and Thisse, 2007, Fujita and Mori, 2005 and Bosker et al. 2010) to do this.  
 
6.1.   Simulation set-up   
In our long run analysis of the Puga (1999) NEG model, additional variables will be taken 
into account compared to those used in the estimation of the wage equation in the previous 
section. Most importantly, see our discussion in section 3, the allocation of the production 
factors Ki (land) and Li (labor) is taken into account. For Ki we take the cultivated arable land 
share of each Prefecture city i in total Chinese arable land in 2002. And, similarly, for Li we 
take the population share of each Prefecture city i in total Chinese population in 2002.
23 We 
                                                 
22 Only special cases provide analytical solutions for multi region settings, such as the assumption that all 
regions are at equidistance. 
23 We decided to consider the Prefecture city of Chongqing as an outlier in the following way. In 1990, the then 
province of Chongqing was awarded the same status as Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin that is of (effectively) a 
province that is also a prefecture city. This administrative change creates a problem for our present purposes 
because the “city” Chongqing is not only much larger than all other prefecture cities it is also huge in terms of 
(arable) land area. In 2002 Chongqing had a population of 31 million people and an arable land area of  2283 (x 
1000 hectare). In population terms this about 3 times as large as the 2
nd and 3
rd largest cities, Shanghai and 
Beijing, and in arable land terms this is more than 4 times as large as these 2 other main cities with the same 
administrative status. These differences really matter in the long run analysis. Especially the land area difference 
matters in the sense that because of the decreasing returns to food production, see section 3, labor is very scarce 
in Chongqing and this puts an upward pressure on local wages to the effect that all Chinese footloose workers 
invariably will end up in Chongqing in the long run. A similar effect would occur if the Chinese authorities 
would suddenly decide to “upgrade” the large and populous provinces of Honan or Anhwei to the prefecture city 
status. To correct for this artificial size of the Prefecture city of Chongqing, we took as its total (2002) population 
only the urban population (9.9 million) of Chongqing and 456 (x1000 hectare) as the arable land area. The latter   19
combine this information with our estimates of the main model parameters (see the previous 
subsection). They are summarized in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2. Main parameter settings in our simulations. 
σ 5.886 
δ 0.632 
γ 0.343 
μ 0.511 
δ 0.879 
Notes: for the details on how we obtained these parameter settings, see section 5. 
 
Furthermore, in some simulations we also take explicit account of the productivity differences 
between prefecture cities, ci, that are due to their differences in human capital or are of an 
unobserved time-invariant nature (most notably controlling for coastal location)
24. 
 
6.2 Allowing for different interregional labor mobility regimes 
Puga (1999) distinguishes between two different cases of labor mobility
25. He considers either 
the case of complete labor immobility or allows for perfect interregional labor mobility. In the 
latter case, workers move in response to the smallest wage differential between cities. The 
typical migration dynamics assumed in standard NEG models are very simple, only taking 
account of this simple notion that workers move in response to any real wage differential 
between locations
26: 
()
i
i
i
dλ
ψ ωω
λ
=−              (7)       
where  ω =  ∑λiωi  is the average real wage across all locations and λi  is the share of 
manufacturing firms in region i; ψ is a parameter determining people’s speed of adjustment. 
  These two extreme cases, although a useful starting point, can be argued to be too 
stylized for our purposes. Neither is the Hukou system so restrictive as to prevent any 
                                                                                                                                                          
is arrived at by taking the average ratio of poputlation and arable land area for Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin and 
applying this to urban population of 9.9. million of Chonqging.           
24 Simulating the model becomes increasingly complex when taking account of these differences in productivity. 
Especially so because they are assumed to be exogenous. It is however quite likely that, due to firm or worker 
reallocation a city’s human capital base or sectoral structure will also change. The NEG model we use is silent 
on these issues. Therefore we do not consider our results on sectoral structure nor population density in Table 1 
in our simulation exercises (both are almost by construction endogenous to migration of firms or workers resp.). 
25Note that we do not simulate different scenarios regarding intersectoral labor mobility. We assume throughout 
that within each Prefecture city inter-sectoral labor mobility is perfect.  
26 Note that the typical NEG model is not a truly dynamic model. Talking about dynamics is therefore somewhat 
artificial.    20
interregional migration, nor does the assumption of workers moving in response to any, 
however small, wage differential realistically depict a world without Hukou’s restrictions. In 
this section we will therefore also look at what happens to China’s long run spatial 
distribution of economic activity in case of other, arguably more realistic migration dynamics.  
In particular, to analyse the relevance of changes in the degree of inter-city labor mobility we 
look at two basic types of scenarios for labor mobility:   
1)  No - or restricted - labor mobility across China  
a.  interregional labor mobility is completely restricted, only firms are allowed to move 
between regions. 
b.  interregional labor mobility is only allowed within provinces only, i.e. people can 
move freely, but only between prefecture cities located in the same province.  
2)  Unrestricted labor mobility across China  
a. perfect interregional labor mobility, workers respond to the smallest wage 
differentials; in equilibrium wages are fully equalized as in (4) 
b.  interregional labor mobility, yet workers only respond to a certain wage differential, 
i.e. in equilibrium real wages are not fully equalized as in (4), instead equilibrium is 
characterized by the following condition:  
max( / ) % , ijj x ij ωωω −=∀        ( 8 )  
c.  interregional labor mobility, but the migration dynamics take into account that 
workers tend to move more easily within provinces and migrate more easily to closer-
by locations. This takes results in Poncet (2006) seriously who shows empirically that 
Chinese migration patterns depend negatively on distance, and have a strong 
provincial bias. Instead of (7) we use (denoting by mij the change a city’s share in total 
population due  to immigration from other lower wage cities or due to emigration to 
other higher wage cities):  
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where NBij is a dummy variable indicating whether cities i and j are located in the 
same province (1=yes; 0=no).    
 
Besides using either of these five different scenarios, we also consider possible combinations 
of these scenarios. For example, we combine migration dynamics as in (9) with incomplete   21
real wage equalization as in (8). Or we combine restricted labor mobility between provinces 
(case 1b above), with migration dynamics within provinces defined by (9). 
Before we present the results of our model simulations under different labor mobility 
scenarios, we would like to stress that these model simulations are certainly not aimed at 
giving a pin-point prediction as to what will happen to Chinese agglomeration patterns once 
more labor mobility is introduced. The model is too stylized to be able to perfectly predict 
which cities will “gain or lose” or by how much (in cases of some degree of labor mobility it 
generally tends to overpredicts the degree of agglomeration – see e.g. Bosker et al. (2010) for 
more on this). But, using the “no labor mobility” case as a benchmark Hukou case, we believe 
that at least in a qualitative sense the model can be used to better understand the implications 
of increased labor mobility for long-run agglomeration outcomes. It is here that our model 
simulations have value added compared to previous NEG-market access studies for China that 
take the spatial allocation of firms and workers as given. 
 
6.3  China’s internal economic geography under different labor mobility regimes 
Given the parameter values discussed above and the initial shares of city population Li and 
arable land Ki, we are now in a position to simulate NEG-based predictions regarding China’s 
internal economic geography under different labor mobility regimes. Referring to Bosker et 
al. (2010) for the full details of the procedure used to simulate the model, we start with 
presenting the results under the assumption of no labor mobility (an extreme Hukou case) and 
subsequently relax the restrictions on inter-Prefecture city labor mobility. 
 
Case 1a: no interregional labor mobility – an extreme Hukou scenario 
As explained in section 3, the long run equilibrium under the assumption of labor immobility 
is such that wages are equalized between the manufacturing and agricultural sectors in each 
location. This simulation refers to an extreme Hukou scenario which is described by equations 
(1)-(3). Under such a scenario the spatial distribution of population remains as in Figure 2a, 
yet firms are able to move between cities in response to differences in profit opportunities. 
Our simulation results for the equilibrium spatial allocation of firms differ slightly from the 
actual distribution of firms across Prefecture cities as shown in Figure 2b. The correlation 
between the simulated distribution of manufacturing firms and the actual distribution in 
Figure 2b is 0.54. The overall degree of spatial concentration is smaller (Herfindahl index 
(HF) is 0.006 compared to the current HF of 0.010). The main difference with the actual 
distribution is that cities that are centrally located in provinces in  the populous heartland of   22
China (recall Figure 2a) slightly “gain” in terms of their firm share at the expense of the 
currently very large cities like Beijing, Tianjin or Shanghai, and also at the expense of more 
peripheral cities. The prefecture cities in the populous provinces of Hebei, Ahnwei, Honan 
and Hupeh gain the most compared to the initial distribution of industrial employment (their 
share of  total industry activity increases by 7.5%). As Chinese internal demand continues to 
become more important, firms will locate close(r) to the largest sources of this demand in 
China’s populous heartland. 
 
Case 1b: only intraprovincial labor mobility 
Next, we loosen the restriction on interregional labor mobility somewhat and look at what 
happens if labor migration is allowed, but only within provinces. In this case, real wages are 
equalized within provinces, but not necessarily between provinces (i.e. we assume migration 
dynamics as in (4) to determine migration patterns between prefecture cities within the same 
province). This follows for instance Fujita et al. (2004) or Poncet (2006) who argue that 
provincial borders matter most for migration and that migration is restricted to nearby cities. 
The case of intra-Provincial labor mobility is also interesting because it has been suggested to 
offer a feasible policy option for Chinese policy makers for a (gradual) loosening of the 
Hukou system (Henderson et al, 2007, p. 9). 
Figure 3 illustrates the resulting long run spatial distribution of firms under this 
scenario (the 0 category means no manufacturing firms at all left in equilbrium)   23
Figure 3.  Intra-provincial Migration – firm distribution 
 
All footloose activity now basically ends up in a single city within each Province, see the  
grey and black dots in Figure 3. The cities with largest firm (and population) shares are Linyi 
(Sjantung province) and Nanyang (Honan province). These cities gain over 7% points each in 
their share of industrial activity compared to their current share. This is a direct consequence 
of the fact that Sjantung and Honan are the two most populous provinces. Moreover, they are 
more centrally located within China (compared to e.g. the also populous provinces of 
Kwantung and Szetsjwan) so that firms producing there can not only take advantage of the 
large internal market of these provinces, but also face lower transport costs to consumers 
outside these provinces. In other words: firms locate there in response to the fact that these 
centrally located cities offer superior market access. This finding is consistent with the 
previous case of no labor mobility when firms already displayed a tendency to move to the 
cities in the centrally located populous provinces. Increasing interregional labor mobility only 
reinforces this pattern. 
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6.4    A relaxation of the Hukou restrictions. 
Our next four scenarios all completely abandon the Hukou system and allow people to freely 
move between prefecture cities. They differ in the migration dynamics assumed, (7) or (9), 
and/or the assumption about people’s reservation wage needed to make them decide to move 
to a different city, (4) or (8). 
Though the details differ (and will be briefly discussed below), the upshot of the 
model simulations for all these 4 cases of unrestricted inter-city labor mobility across China is 
that one ends up with very different agglomeration outcomes compared to either the extreme 
Hukou case (1a above) or the provincially restricted Hukou system scenario (1b above). They 
indicate much stronger core-periphery patterns that these two other cases. Although suffering 
from the general NEG tendency to overstate the degree of agglomeration (in two of the four 
scenarios all footloose activity agglomerates in a single city), our simulation results lead to 
two key qualitative findings  
First, all four scenarios strongly reinforce the tendency of firms to locate in the currently 
populous heartland of China (roughly within the Shanghai-Beijng-Chongqing triangle) that 
already showed (albeit much less pronounced) in scenario 1a and 1b. Firms locate close to 
large sources of demand that are further more centrally located within China so that other 
cities can be reached at low cost. However, in case of unrestricted labor mobility (especially 
when people move in response to the smallest wage differential) this pattern is further 
reinforced by people following firms to these places in search of higher wages. This in turn 
draws in more firms, etc. In the end production becomes concentrated in a few cities only. 
They are located in the (non-coastal) provinces of Honan and Anhwei that gain most in 
importance compared to their current share in overall economic activity.  
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Figure 4. Increased agglomeration within the Shanghai-Beijng-Chongqing triangle 
 
This general prediction follows from each of our four different scenarios. They however differ 
in their exact prediction of where footloose activity ends up.  
 
Case 2a: migration dynamics as in (7) and migration in response to the smallest wage 
differentials (4) 
This is the opposite scenario to the extreme Hukou case. People are completely free as to 
where they locate. Moreover people’s preferences are such that they will move in response to 
the smallest difference in wages between cities. This scenario basically takes the Puga (1999) 
NEG model at face value and assumes that labor migration is determined by real wage 
equalization condition (4) and the associated standard NEG migration dynamics (7). In this 
case the Prefecture city of Nanyang (Honan province) becomes the only industrial center of 
China. This tendency of NEG models to display (near) full agglomerations in case of labor 
mobility is well-known and too stark to be true (see Bosker et al., 2010). It is a result of the 
underlying equilibrium condition (4) that people move in response to the smallest wage 
differential. 
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Case 2b: migration dynamics as in (9) and migration in response to the smallest wage 
differential as in (4) 
Again due to assumption (4) we end up with one city becoming China’s sole industrial center. 
Yet in this case, it is the city of Zhoukou that attracts all footloose activity. This is the result 
of the different migration dynamics assumed. The distance penalty on migration imposed by 
(9), takes account of the empirical finding by Poncet (2006) that people prefer moves over 
shorter distances. This makes the adjustment process to the long run spatial equilibrium 
behaves more smoothly over space. As such the currently large population concentrations in 
China’s coastal provinces move more slowly towards its populous heartland – so that a more 
easterly located city, i.e. Zhoukou, becomes the industrial centre compared to the case when 
assuming the much simpler, a-spatial, migration dynamics in (4). 
 
Cases 2c and 2d: migration dynamics as in (7) or (9) respectively and migration only in 
response to a sufficiently large wage differential (8) 
The extreme agglomeration outcomes in case 2a and 2b arise mainly from the (unrealistic) 
assumption of people being willing to move in response to any wage differential, however 
small. Case 2c and 2d relax this assumption and take account of the fact that migration is 
costly: we assume that a threshold of 10% in wage differences needs to be crossed before 
workers are willing to migrate, see (8). Imposing such a threshold basically increases the 
number of possible long-run equilibria because real wages do not have to be equalized. Any 
spatial allocation for which all inter-city real wage differentials are smaller than 10% will now 
be a long-run spatial equilibrium. 
The result of doing this, is that we end up with less extreme agglomeration outcomes. 
We no longer find that all footloose industrial activity agglomerates in a single city. Still, 
most industrial activity is located in prefecture cities in the Honan province (most notably 
Nanyang and Zhoukou) or in the other cities in the triangle depicted in Figure 2. Yet, we now 
also find some, be it mostly only little, footloose economic activity in the currently very large 
agglomerations of Tianjin, Harbin, Shanghai, Chongqing, or Chengdu. 
 
6.5  Sensitivity of our model simulations 
We performed three sensitivity analyses to verify the robustness of our findings. First, we 
allowed for the fact that market access is not the only determinant of Chinese wages and 
incorporated the estimation results for the city fixed effects and human capital into our model 
simulations as well. Second, we lowered the distance decay parameter in our distance   27
function to capture in a simple way what would happen if transport costs will fall, due to for 
instance the large scale improvements in the inter-city infrastructure that are currently 
underway in many parts of China (see also Faber, 2009 and Roberts et al, 2010). In particular, 
we lowered our baseline distance decay parameter of 0.63 (see Table 2) to 0.36 or 0.1 
respectively. Third, given the importance of the (arable) land variable in the Puga (1999) 
NEG model and the considerable (arable) land differences between the Prefecture cities in our 
sample, we also re-ran all simulations with all cities having the same (arable) land size 
(effectively removing differences between prefecture cities in the congestion force posed by 
differences in their land supply). In general, all these sensitivity analyses do not change the 
resulting equilibria in a qualitative sense.  
Taking account of other (exogenously driven) productivity differences between cities 
as captured by our city fixed effects and human capital, still results in cities in China’s 
populous heartland attracting the bulk of footloose economic activity. However, now the city 
of Liu’an in the Ahnwei province attracts the footloose activity in case of perfect labor 
mobility in response to the smallest real wage differential (that is, equations (4) and (7) hold). 
This city (see Figure 4 above) is located somewhat closer to the coast, reflecting the generally 
higher wages coastal locations can pay (captured by our city fixed effects) given their 
preferential location for exporting to world markets. 
Lowering trade costs (lowering δ) generally reinforces the tendency of firms to 
agglomerate. This is in accordance with NEG’s prediction that ceteris paribus lower trade 
costs tend to foster agglomeration. With lower trade costs firms can take advantage of co-
locating in big agglomerations while incurring fewer costs of shipping their goods to 
consumers in the periphery. 
Things also marginally change when we abstract from differences in arable land 
endowment between cities. In the presence of these differences, the same amount of workers 
poses stronger congestion problems to cities that are smaller in terms of their land 
endowment. Assuming each city to be of similar size, essentially equalizes the strength of 
congestion forces between cities.
27 Again most of our earlier results come through. However, 
we now find one notable exception. In the case of perfect labor mobility Shanghai attracts all 
footloose activity when migrants move in response to the smallest real wage differential (4). 
                                                 
27 As explained in section 3 arable land differences are important in the NEG model of Puga (1999) because with 
decreasing returns in the production of the agricultural good, less arable land implies lower agricultural (rural) 
wages, implying that for manufacturing firms, ceteris paribus, it is relatively easy to lure workers away from the 
agricultural sector. Without these arable land differences the (relative) agglomeration force of regions with more 
arable land is absent.    28
However this is only the case when people move according to the simple migration rule in 
(9). When taking account of the empirical finding that internal migration in China is also 
determined by distance and has a strong provincial bias (using migration dynamics as in (9) 
based on Poncet, 2006), we no longer find that Shanghai attracts all footloose economic 
activity. Instead, and similar to our baseline case, the economic centre shifts back to the cities 
in the Anhwei or Honan province (the Prefecture cities of Liu’an or Zhoukou respectively, 
depending on whether or not we also allow for (exogenous) productivity differences between 
cities). 
 
6.6   Summing up 
Overall, our simulation results show the value added of moving beyond confirming the spatial 
wage pattern predicted by NEG theory. Taking the full NEG model seriously, leads to 
interesting insights about the (possible) future of China’s internal economic geography. It 
provides theory-based predictions as to how the spatial distribution of footloose economic 
activity may respond to different labor mobility regimes. 
First, and similar to e.g. Au and Henderson (2006a) that use a different empirical 
strategy, we find that relaxing Hukou’s restrictions will lead to more pronounced core-
periphery patterns. More interesting perhaps, our simulations show that the initial differences 
in market size do not need to be conclusive in determining the long-run equilibrium location 
of firms and workers once labor mobility is allowed for. We do not find that increased labor 
mobility will only strengthen the current agglomeration pattern in China. Instead, and 
although the NEG model probably overpredicts actual future agglomeration trends, an 
important insight from our results is that the spatial distribution of Chinese internal demand 
will be one of the important determinants of its future economic geography. Our results show 
a clear tendency of firms to agglomerate in currently medium-sized (from a Chinese 
perspective) cities, like Zhoukou, Nanjing or Liu’an in China’s populous heartland (see 
Figure 4). 
Based on simulations of a multi-region version of the core Krugman (1991) NEG 
model, Krugman (1993) already showed that initial size need not be decisive in determining 
which location(s) attract most (or all) footloose economic activity in equilibrium.
28 In case of 
China this explains why a Prefecture city like Liuan with “only” 6.3 million people can 
                                                 
28 For a further illustration of the feature of NEG models that initial size need not be decisive for the final or 
equilibrium allocation of footloose activity, see for instance Brakman, Garretsen, and Van Marrewijk (2009), pp. 
296-299.      29
become an agglomeration in the long-run. Liuan thrives upon its centrality. It offers firms and 
workers a superior location in terms of access to China’s vast (and increasingly important) 
internal market. 
 
7.  Conclusions    
In this paper we use a new economic geography (NEG) model to analyse the relationship 
between market access, labor mobility and agglomeration for China. Using this model we 
provide theory-based answers to the question how China’s internal economic geography 
might be affected by a relaxation of its current Hukou system that puts severe restrictions on 
workers’ interregional mobility.  
Our paper crucially differs from related recent NEG studies for China (e.g. Ma, 2006, 
Lin, 2003, Hering and Poncet, 2010, 2007, De Sousa and Poncet, 2007, Amiti and Javorcik, 
2008). We do not take the spatial allocation of labor (and firms) as given. Instead, we make 
use of the complete NEG model and not just the equilibrium (nominal) wage equation. Based 
on our estimates of the key NEG model parameters, we go one step further and simulate the 
full NEG model. This enables us to analyse the possible effects of relaxing China’s Hukou 
system on its internal economic geography. In doing so, we also go beyond the simple 
migration dynamics that underlie most theoretical NEG models, and consider more realistic 
migration dynamics.  
Our main findings show that a relaxation of the restrictions on labor mobility posed by 
the Hukou system will lead to more pronounced core-periphery outcomes. Interestingly, the 
economic geography of China that would result from such increased labor mobility is first and 
foremost determined by within China differences in market access, population and (arable) 
land. The geography of China’s own internal demand is the most important determinant of its 
future economic geography. Given the increasing importance of China’s own domestic 
market, international market access is of less significance in determining the spatial 
distribution of economic activity within China itself. Our simulations show that increased 
labor mobility would primarily benefit non-coastal Prefecture cities like Zhoukou or Liuan in 
the large and populous Honan and Anhwei provinces. These cities offer firms and workers 
superior access to China’s vast internal market. The currently economically dominant 
prefecture cities like Shanghai, Tianjin or Guangzhou do not necessarily end up being the 
(only) main centers of economic activity once inter-city firm and labor mobility is taken into 
account. As such, our analysis suggests that the (spatial) distribution of China’s own internal   30
demand will be an important determinant of its future economic geography, in particular so 
when interregional labor  mobility would become less restricted. 
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Appendix A1.   Basic set up of the M-region version of the Puga (1999) model 
 
Consider a world consisting of R regions. Each of region i = 1,…,R is populated by Li workers and 
endowed with Ki units of arable land. Each region’s economy consists if two sectors: agriculture and 
industry. Labor is used by both sectors and is mobile between sectors within a region and it is either 
mobile or immobile between regions. Land on the other hand is used only by the agricultural sector 
and is immobile between regions. 
 
Production 
The agricultural good is produced under perfect competition and free entry and exit using Cobb-
Douglas technology. Moreover it is freely tradable between regions.  
 
The industrial sector produces heterogeneous varieties of a single good under monopolistic 
competition and free entry and exit. Industrial production technology is characterized by increasing 
returns to scale, i.e. production of a quantity x(h) of any variety h requires fixed costs ci α and variable 
costs ciβ that are both assumed to be the same in each region, but can differ between regions due to 
differences in e.g. production efficiency, ci. This, together with free entry and exit and profit 
maximization, ensures that in equilibrium each variety is produced by a single firm in a single region. 
The production input is a Cobb-Douglas composite of labor and intermediates, with 0 ≤ μ ≤ 1 the 
Cobb-Douglas share of intermediates. Intermediates enter the production function as a composite 
manufacturing good that is specified as a CES-aggregate (with σ > 1 the elasticity of substitution 
across varieties) of all manufacturing varieties produced.  
 
Firms in principle sell their goods to all regions. But, shipping their goods to foreign markets incurs 
so-called ‘iceberg’ trade costs (τij ≥ 1 goods have to be shipped from region i to let one good arrive in 
region j). Taking these costs into account, gives the following profit function that is similar for each 
firm in region i: 
1 () () / [ () ]
RR
M
ii j i j i j i i i i j
jj
p hx h T w qc x h
μμ πα β
− =− + ∑∑       ( 1 )  
where pij(h) is the price of a variety produced in country i, qi is the price index of the composite 
manufacturing good,
M
i w the manufacturing wage in region i. 
 
Preferences 
Consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over the agricultural good and a CES-composite (also 
with σ > 1 the elasticity of substitution across varieties) of manufacturing varieties, with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 the 
Cobb-Douglas share of the composite manufacturing good. Specifying the composite manufacturing   34
good this way ensures demand from each region for each manufacturing variety, which, together with 
the fact that each variety is produced by a single firm in a single region, implies that trade takes place 
between regions. 
 
Equilibrium 
Having specified preferences over, and the production technologies of, the manufacturing and 
agricultural good, the equilibrium conditions of the model can be calculated. Profit maximization and 
free entry and exit determine the share of labor employed, 
A
i L , and the wage level,
A
i w , in agriculture, 
as well as the rent earned per unit of land  ()
A
i rw . The former two in turn pin down the share of 
workers in manufacturing, i ς . Given the assumed Cobb-Douglas production function in agriculture, 
with labor share θ, we have that:  
1
1
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        ( 2 )  
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 denotes the Cobb-Douglas share of labor in agriculture, and 
M
i L  and 
A
i L  the number 
of workers in manufacturing and agriculture respectively. Equation (2) shows that, in contrast to 
Krugman (1991), where agriculture uses only land (θ = 0), or to Venables (1996), where agriculture 
employs only labor (θ = 1), the share of a region’s labor employed in manufacturing is endogenously 
determined in this model. It increases with a region’s labor endowment and agricultural wage level 
and decreases with a region’s land endowment and with the Cobb-Douglas share of labor in 
agricultural production. Consumer preferences in turn determine total demand for agricultural products 
in region i as:  
  (1 )
A
ii x Y γ =−              ( 3 )  
 
In the industrial sector, profit maximization and free entry and exit, gives the familiar result that all 
firms in region i set the same price for their produced manufacturing variety as being a constant 
markup over marginal costs: 
 
(1 )
1
M
ii i i pc q w
μμ σβ
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          ( 4 )  
where qi is the price index of the composite manufacturing good in region i defined by: 
1
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where ni denotes the number of firms in region i and   35
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is the manufacturing wage level in region i. 
 
Utility maximization on behalf of the consumers in turn gives total demand for each manufacturing 
variety produced (coming from both the home region i as well as foreign regions j) which is the same 
for each variety in the same region due to the way consumer preferences are specified: 
 
(1 ) 1
ii j j i j
j
xp e q
σ σσ τ
−− − =∫           ( 7 )  
where in (7) demand from each foreign region j is multiplied by τij because (τij –1) of the amount of 
the product ordered from region i melts away in transit (the iceberg assumption). 
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is total expenditure on manufacturing varieties in region i (the first term representing consumer 
expenditure and the second term producer expenditure on intermediates), where 
(1 ) ( )
AM A
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is total consumer income consisting of workers’ wage income, landowners’ rents and entrepreneurs’ 
profits respectively. Due to free entry and exit these profits are driven to zero, which (after substituting 
for wages, tthereby uniquely defining a firm’s equilibrium output at: 
  (1 ) / i x α σβ =−          ( 1 0 )  
Finally, to close the model, the labor markets are assumed to clear: 
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where the demand for labor in agriculture, 
A
i L , follows from the assumption of Cobb-Douglas 
technology in agriculture and the term between square brackets represents the total manufacturing 
wage bill. Moreover equating labor supply to labor demand in the industrial sector gives an immediate 
relationship between the number of firms and the number of workers in industry:  
(1 )
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Long run equilibrium 
Next, to solve for the long run equilibrium, Puga (1999) distinguishes between the case where labor is 
both interregionally and intersectorally mobile and the case when it is only intersectorally mobile. 
Without interregional labor mobility, long run equilibrium is reached when the distribution of labor   36
between the agricultural and the industrial sector in each region is such that wages are equal in both 
sectors. This is ensured by labor being perfectly mobile between sectors driving intersectoral wage 
differences to zero. When instead labor is also interregionally mobile, not only intersectoral wage 
differences are driven to zero in all regions in equilibrium. Workers now also respond to real wage 
(utility) differences between regions by moving to regions with the higher real wages (utility) until 
real wages are equalized between all regions, hereby defining the long run equilibrium 
 
Interregional labor immobility 
The long run equilibrium in case of interregional labor immobility can now be shown to be a solution 
{wi,qi} of three equations that have to hold in each region
29. In our case (when using wage-worker 
space) these are, using the fact that in equilibrium
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where (13) is obtained by substituting (4) and (12) into (5), (14) by substituting (4) and (10) into (7), 
and (15) by substituting (4), (10) and (12) into (8). 
 
Interregional labor mobility 
In case of interregional labor mobility, a solution to (13)-(15) merely constitutes a short run 
equilibrium. With interregional labor mobility, workers will move between regions in response to real 
wage differences until the interregional real wage differences, that are possible to persist when 
workers are unable (or unwilling) to move between regions, are no longer present. More formally, the 
LRE solution {wi,qi} for each region i has to adhere to the additional condition that real wages, ωi, are 
equal across all regions: 
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29 Without loss of generality, α and β are set at 1/σ and  (σ-1)/ σ respectively.   37
Appendix A2. Chinese provinces and the Prefecture cities in our data set 
      
Beijing Tianjin  Hebei  Sjansi  Inner Mongolian  
Aut. Region  Liaoning Kirin  Heilunkiang  Shanghai  Kiangsu Tsekiang  Anhwei 
Beijing Tianjin Shijiazhuang  Taiyuan  Hohhot  Shenyang  Changchun Harbin  Shanghai  Nanjing  Hangzhou  Hefei 
  Tangshan  Datong  Baotou  Dalian  Jilin  city  Qiqihar    Wuxi  Ningbo  Wuhu 
  Qinhuangdao  Yangquan  Wuhai  Anshan  Siping Jixi    Xuzhou  Wenzhou  Bengbu 
  Handan  Changzhi  Chifeng  Fushun  Liaoyuan Hegang    Changzhou  Jiaxing Huainan 
  Xingtai  Jincheng  Tongliao  Benxi  Tonghua Shuangyashan  Suzhou Huzhou  Maanshan 
  Baoding  Shuozhou  Dandong  Changbaishan  Daqing   Nantong  Shaoxing  Huaibei 
  Zhangjiakou  Yuncheng  Jinzhou  Songyuan Yinchun    Lianyungang Jinhua  Tongling 
  Chengde  Xinzhou  Yingkou  Baicheng  Jiamusi   Huaian  Quzhou  Anqing 
  Cangzhou  Linfen    Fuxin    Qitaihe   Yancheng  Zhoushan  Huangshan
  Langfang    Liaoyang    Mudanjiang    Yangzhou  Taizhou  Chuzhou 
  Hengshui    Panjin    Heihe    Zhenjiang  Lishui  Fuyang 
        Tieling    Suihua    Taizhou    Suzhou 
        Chaoyang        Suqian    Chaohu 
        Huludao            Liuan 
                    Bozhou 
Fujian Kiangsi  Sjantung  Honan  Hupeh  Hunan  Kwantung  Kwangsi  Hainan Szetsjwan  Kweitsjou  Yunnan 
Fuzhou Nanchang  Ji'nan  Zhengzhou  Wuhan  Changsha Guangzhou Nanning  Haikou  Chengdu  Guiyang  Kunming 
Xiamen Jingdezhen Qingdao  Kaifeng  Huangshi Zhuzhou  Shaoguan  Liuzhou  Sanya Zigong  Liupanshui  Qujing 
Putian Pingxiang  Zibo  Luoyang Shiyan  Xiangtan Shenzhen Guilin    Panzhihua  Zunyi  Yuxi 
Sanming Jiujiang  Zaozhuang Pingdingshan Yichang Hengyang  Zhuhai  Wuzhou    Luzhou  Anshun  Zhaotong 
Quanzhou Xinyu  Dongying  Anyang  Xiangfan  Shaoyang Shantou  Beihai    Deyang    Baoshan 
Zhangzhou Yingtan  Yantai  Hebi  Ezhou  Yueyang Foshan  Fangchenggang  Mianyang     
Nanping Ganzhou  Weifang  Xinxiang  Jingmen Changde  Jiangmen  Qingzhou    Guangyuan   
Longyan Ji'an  Jining  Jiaozuo  Xiaogan  Zhangjiajie Zhanjiang  Guigang    Suining     
Ningde Yichun  Taian  Puyang  Jingzhou  Yiyang  Maoming  Yulin    Neijiang     
 Shangrao  Weihai  Xuchang  Huanggang Chenzhou Zhaoqing  Hezhou    Leshan     
  Rizhao  Luohe  Xianning  Yongzhou  Huizhou Baise    Nanchong     
  Laiwu  Sanmenxia  Suizhou  Huaihua  Meizhou  Hechi    Yibin     
  Linyi  Nanyang  Loudi  Shanwei    Dazhou     
  Dezhou  Shangqiu    Heyuan    Yaan     
  Liaocheng  Xinyang    Yangjiang    Bazhong       38
Table continued 
                
Fujian Kiangsi  Sjantung  Honan  Hupeh  Hunan  Kwantung  Kwangsi  Hainan Szetsjwan  Kweitsjou  Yunnan 
  Binzhou  Zhoukou    Qingyuan    Ziyang     
  Heze  Zhumadian    Dongguan       
         Zhongshan         
         Chaozhou         
         Jieyang         
         Yunfu         
Shaanxi Kansu  Tsinghai  Ningsia  Xinjiang Uyghur  
Aut. Region  Chongqing           
Xi'an Lanzhou  Xining  Yinchuan Urumqi  Chongqing           
Tongchuan Jiayuguan  Shizuishan  Karamay             
Baoji Jinchang  Wuzhong              
Xianyang Baiyin                   
Weinan Tianshui                 
Yan'an Jiuquan                   
Hanzhong Zhangye                 
Yulin Wuwei                   
Ankang Pingliang                 
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